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DECONSTRUCTING CAPUTO'S 
DEMYTHOLOGIZING HElD EGGER 
George Connell 
John Caputo's Demythologizing Heidegger represents an important, distinctive, 
and intriguing attempt to make sense of Heidegger's notorious involvement 
with Nazism. Where others have tended to emphasize biographical and socio-
logical factors in understanding Heidegger's involvement with Nazism, 
Caputo traces that involvement to fateful turns in Heidegger's development as 
a thinker. While I am sympathetic with such an undertaking, I find Caputo's 
account highly questionable and even self-opposed, especially as regards his 
apparent valorization of Kierkegaard and of biblical faith as influences that 
could have saved Heidegger from Nazism had he not turned away from them 
in favor of Nietzsche and the presocratic Greeks. 
Now that the breadth and depth of Heidegger's involvement with 
Nazism is clear, the question of the meaning of that involvement looms 
over all current critical engagements with Heidegger and his thought. 
While most prominent attempts to make sense of this great thinker's 
association with a demonic regime, in particular those of Farias, Ott, and 
Zimmerman, stress various aspects of Heidegger's social and cultural 
milieu, John Caputo's recent Demythologizing Heidegger represents an 
interesting contrast in telling a story of great beginnings going horribly 
awry because of a tragic flaw, a fatal blind spot, in its protagonist. In so 
doing, he periodizes Heidegger's career as a thinker, separating the basi-
cally sound and salutary work of the 20s from the dangerously misguid-
ed thinking subsequent to Heidegger's return from Marburg to 
Freiburg. Adding, as it were, a chapter to Eliza Butler's The Tyranny of 
Greece Over Germany, Caputo closely associates Heidegger's movement 
toward Nazism with his elevation of the Greeks, especially the 
Presocratics, to a unique and privileged status. As compelling and illu-
minating as Caputo's story is, I find fundamental elements of it highly 
questionable and even self-opposed. In particular, I have questions 
about the ways Caputo explicitly valorizes the biblical witness as a nec-
essary corrective to philosophy while implicitly pressing a philosophi-
cal polemic against fundamental aspects of that biblical witness. It is in 
looking closely at Caputo's frequent but tendentious invocations of 
Kierkegaard in telling his story that I intend to expose these internal ten-
sions. But first to a brief summary of that story. 
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Heidegger's Wrong Kehrung 
As I noted above, Caputo wants to distinguish fundamentally the 
Heidegger of the 20s from the Heidegger of the 30s and after. He charac-
terizes the project of the earlier Heidegger as follows: 
The first Freiburg project, entitled a "hermeneutics of facticity," took 
the form of a two-pronged retrieval: on the one hand, of the factical 
lifeworld of the New Testament communities, which lay sedimented 
beneath the dogmatic ontotheology of the tradition; and, on the other 
hand, of the factical lifeworld of Aristotelian ethics, which lay sedi-
mented beneath the metaphysics of ousia. The movements and 
rhythms of these "prephilosophical" sources - life before the long 
arm of philosophical conceptuality reaches it - were to be the sources 
from which philosophy itself would draw a new breath. (DH 3-4) 
As Caputo sees it, Heidegger's great insights and his great blindness 
combine in this project, just as the Greek tragic hero's distinctive virtue and 
tragic flaw are two sides of the same coin. And the common coin, on 
Caputo's reading, of Heidegger's insights and blindness, of his triumph 
and downfall, is that favorite postmodern denomination, otherness. First, 
Heidegger's project of a hermeneutics of facticity shows him to be (despite 
his later protestations) an existentialist, a philosopher committed to think-
ing life in all its thickness and solidity rather than simply playing a concep-
tual glass bead game. But existence, facticallife, not only always ultimate-
ly eludes thought, it disrupts it. Caputo writes: 
Heidegger's original strategy - to disrupt philosophy and the uni-
versity by exposing it to philosophy's other - is brilliantly conceived. 
Heidegger wants to let philosophical conceptuality be disrupted by 
the concrete experience of life in the New Testament and by Aristotle 
conceived in terms of the practical philosophy rather than meta-
physics. The disruption of philosophy so conceived was aimed at a 
renewal of philosophy, not simply of leaving philosophy behind. 
The whole notion of restoring life to its original difficulty, to all of the 
concreteness of facticity itself, taken in its original difficulty, to all of 
the concreteness of facticity itself, taken in its original Aristotelian 
and Kierkegaardian sense, is, I think, an immensely salutary and sug-
gestive move.(DH 57) 
A second salutary dimension of otherness Caputo finds in the 
"hermeneutics of facticity" project is Heidegger's readiness to bring togeth-
er those two perennial others, Athens and Jerusalem, the Greek and the 
Hebraic. While many culture critics today would see in this a hegemonic 
privileging of ancient, patriarchal Mediterranean cultures, Caputo sees 
Heidegger's syncretism through the particular lens of the French postmod-
ernist category of the "jew greek." He writes: 
The "jewgreek" is the miscegenated state of one who is neither pure-
30 Faith and Philosophy 
ly Greek nor purely Jewish, who is too philosophical to be a pure Jew 
and too biblical to be pure Greek, who is attached to both philoso-
phers and prophets .... (DH 6) 
By "jew" I mean above all what Lyotard calls les juifs, so that the 
expression"jewgreek" mean(s) everyone who is out, outside, silenced, 
deprived of an idiom or home or both, who is either forbidden to use 
or has learned to despise his mother tongue, everyone who is 
Abrahamic, driven from native land, and, over and beyond Abraham, 
everyone who is Ishmaelic, for Ishmael was disowned by Abraham 
and Sarah in the name of protecting the purity of their legitimate line. 
Jewgreek means Auschwitz, and every other name of ignominy and 
suffering, all the Auschwitizes, the victims of all the Nazisms, wherev-
er they are found, in South Africa or the South Bronx, in El Salvador 
or Northern Ireland or on the West Bank.(DH 7) 
But while Heidegger brilliantly expounded both Paul and Aristotle in his 
lectures of the 20s, he is by no stretch of the imagination a champion of 
the"jewgreek" as understood by Caputo. Hardly; such champions of the 
despised and excluded don't join the Nazi movement. And here lies the 
fundamental question for Caputo: How did the same philosopher who so 
beneficially opened philosophy to facticallife and Greek thought to Jewish 
and Christian faith become a Nazi? In what is to me the most compelling 
dimension of this book, Caputo argues that Heidegger's failure to see the 
difference between the Jewish and the Greek blinds him to what is distinc-
tively biblical: the identification of justice with response to the needs of 
widows and orphans, of strangers and lepers; the elevation of kardia, the 
love of the neighbor, as coequal and even equivalent to the love of God. 
Caputo shows that Heidegger's reading of Christian texts always focused 
on the themes of fighting the good fight, running the race, suffering the 
thorn in the flesh, taking up one's cross; all this he construes as versions of 
the Greek maxim that all beautiful things are difficult. But he failed to see 
that the Greek equations of the good and the beautiful, of excellence and 
virtue, are profoundly at odds with the biblical vision. Caputo writes: 
So the fabric and texture of facticallife were decidedly different in 
the two cases. On the one hand, a hermeneutics of excellence and arete, 
of putting everything in order with the order of rank. On the other 
hand, a hermeneutics not of glory but of humiliation, not of the strong 
and erect but of those who have been laid low, not of the great but of 
the small, not of the straight but of the crooked and bent, not of the 
beautiful but of the ugly, not of athletes but lepers, not of eudaimonia 
but of misery, not of prudence but of mercy, not of order of rank but of 
all those who drop to the bottom of wherever a logos and a polemos 
shake things down and distribute them into a hierarchy. (DH 62-3) 
Caputo convincingly shows that Heidegger was effectively oblivious to 
this dimension of the New Testament. But Caputo goes on to claim, first, 
that this obliviousness leads to Heidegger's elevation of the Greeks to 
mythic status and, further, to his infamous and never recanted involve-
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ment with the Nazis. What case does he make for these claims? 
At its least controversial but also lamest, Caputo's indictment is one of 
omission rather than commission. In the final two pages of Chapter Two, 
he repeats with minor variation an almost ritual incantation: 
So there was nothing in Heidegger's appropriation of the New 
Testament ... to serve as a precaution against the reading that Ernst 
Junger gave to pain .. There was nothing in this hermeneutics to resist 
Nietzsche's famous saying ... [that] what does not kill me makes me 
stronger. In short, there was nothing in Heidegger's hermeneutics of 
factical life in the New Testament to insulate him against the con-
tempt and scorn which Junger and Nietzsche would heap upon New 
Testament ethics, .... 
There was nothing in Heidegger's appropriation of the New 
Testament categories to lead him to look upon the events of history 
from the view of the victims of history, .... 
There was, as it turned out, nothing ... to stop it from running 
straight into Kampf-philosophy, a great myth of Being's struggle in 
and through a people chosen by Being's hand .... (DH 58-9) 
Now, this is a pretty weak indictment, as Caputo effectively admits with 
his completion of the last sentence quoted above: " ... -even as there was 
originally nothing about it intrinsically to necessitate such a fateful 
turn."(DH 59) How, then, does Caputo build his case for the ambitious 
thesis that Heidegger's misreading of the New Testament somehow leads 
him to aggrandize hyperbolically the Greeks and to become a Nazi? And 
how does he support the initially outrageous claim that immoderate 
Hellenophilism somehow predisposes one to or outright causes Nazism? 
A clue to answering this question is to be found in the passage just quot-
ed in which Caputo expands his reference to kampf- philosophy with the 
phrase, " a great myth of Being's struggle in and through a people chosen 
by Being's hand ... "(DH 59) Caputo here refers to Heidegger's belief that 
the early Greeks had been granted a special awareness of Being that had 
subsequently been lost but which it was now up to the Germans to 
reawaken. On the first page of Demythologizing Heidegger, Caputo 
describes this belief, which he calls the myth of being, thus: 
By [the myth of Being] I mean the tendency of Heidegger to con-
struct a fantastic portrait of the Greek sources of Western thought 
and culture - in the most classically German manner - and to rep-
resent these Greek sources as a single, surpassing, great "Origin" 
(Ursprung), a primordial incipience or "Beginning" (Anfang) of the 
West. On such a scheme the Greeks do not represent merely the his-
torical start of certain Western linguistic, scientific, and social tradi-
tions. For Heidegger, "Greeks" are nothing merely "historical" 
(geschichtlich) at all, but something destining (,?eschicklich), something 
steering the very destiny (Geschick) of the West,. ... These Greeks rep-
resent an overarching, normative claiming Origin to which "we" -
and who "we" are is a critical issue here - are all bound more pri-
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mordially than we can say and in reference to which everything later 
is to be compared, either as falling away and oblivion or as the scene 
of its retrieval."(DH 1) 
It is this myth that Caputo targets in titling his book, Demythologizing 
Heidegger. According to Caputo, it is this dimension of Heidegger's 
thought that needs to be exposed, questioned, deconstructed and removed 
if that thought is to be rehabilitated and employed by right thinking people 
today; for it is this aspect of Heidegger's thought that marked it as gen-
uinely Nazi. He writes: 
It cannot be forgotten that it was in the context of the National 
Socialist seizure of power that Heidegger narrowed down the begin-
nings of the West to a single "Origin" - Anfang and Ursprung -
purely Greek, without Jewish and Christian contamination, and tied 
the future of the West to the German future, to the German capacity 
for thinking and questioning Being. The first form of the myth of 
Being is a political myth tied to a hellish ideology, fully equipped 
with robust and quite bellicose Greek gods and their German heirs, 
in which Heidegger undertook to produce a thought of Being that 
was judenrein, thereby reproducing on the level of thinking what the 
Nazis were doing in the streets.(DH 4) 
As Caputo tells it, Heidegger's failure to grasp the distinctiveness of the 
New Testament (as opposed to the Greeks) leads to a onesided emphasis 
on struggle and strife, or, to use his loaded term, kampf. This, in turn, 
leaves Heidegger prone to the anti-Christian diatribes of JUnger and 
Nietzsche and thus leads to an attempt to purge all Semitic elements from 
his thought so as to fulfill the Germanic mission of retrieving that which is 
pure Greek. And this is the intellectual analog to Hitler's project of 
reestablishing Aryan racial purity. 
As a work of historical explanation, this narrative is highly questionable. 
First, huge gaps loom between causes and effects. For example, one could 
well emphasize the stress and struggle aspects of the New Testament - one 
thinks of Karl Barth's commentary on Romans in which militaristic 
imagery abounds - without ultimately becoming either anti-Christian or 
Nazi. And one could respond positively to Nietzsche's anti-Christian dia-
tribes without feeling any attraction to the Nazis. Further, Caputo's 
account seems self-opposed. Heidegger's failure to see the difference 
between Greek and New Testament values ultimately leads him to purge 
all traces of the New Testament from his thought because of its perceived 
difference from the Greek? Ultimately, if we judge Caputo's book as a 
piece of historical explanation, it is a failure. 
But it is a mistake to read Caputo's book as a rival historical and bio-
graphical explanation to those of, say, Ott and Zimmerman. Just as 
Bultmann's project of demythologizing focused on the contemporary-sig-
nificance of the biblical kerygma, Caputo's Demythologizing Heidegger 
focuses on the contemporary significance of Heidegger's thought. But 
Caputo uses the word "demythologizing" with a caveat: he denies that it is 
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possible to arrive at some naked, absolute truth through such a process. 
Since, as he sees it, we always view reality through one myth or another, 
myth here designating broadly a contingent conceptual or narrative 
scheme, to demythologize is really to remythologize. By his own admis-
sion, then, Caputo is constructing a mythic account of Heidegger which, 
like Heidegger's mythic accounts of the Greeks, is intended to guide and 
shape contemporary thinking and acting rather than just to contemplate 
the past. The real point of Caputo's book is to denounce as Nazi in spirit 
any attempt to single out, to privilege, to keep pure anyone people or cul-
ture or faith. In presenting the cautionary tale of how Heidegger went 
astray, Caputo effectively makes a plea for the vision that sails today under 
the flag of multiculturalism. He writes: 
The result, or one possible result, of this demythologizing is a 
world that, with the exception of its ecologism, Heidegger - the man -
would abhor. It is a multilingual, multicultural, miscegenated, poly-
morphic, pluralistic world without national-ethnic unity, without the 
unity of a single language or a deep monolinguistic tradition. It is a 
world of gay rights and feminists, of radically democratic, anti-hier-
archical, anti-elitist structures, with a pragmatic view of truth and 
principles, and in which children would be educated not in a classical 
Gymnasium but in free public institutions with schools in which 
Andy Warhol would get as big a hearing as Sophocles and 
Aeschylus, schools filled with computers and the latest technological 
advances, schools that would make a particular effort to reach the 
disadvantaged. Heidegger would rather be dead. (DH 97) 
Caputo's Kierkegaard 
Caputo's intention to read the Heidegger affair as a cautionary tale full 
of present significance is reflected in the way that Caputo constantly uses 
the contemporary thinkers, Levinas, Lyotard, and Derrida, as foils to 
expose what is right and what is wrong with Heidegger's thinking.! But 
given this prospective emphasis on how these three French thinkers devel-
op elements of Heidegger in very different ways than Heidegger did, what 
sense can we make of Caputo's retrospective emphasis on Kierkegaard? 
Throughout Caputo's narrative of Heidegger's development, Kierkegaard 
figures decisively. First, Heidegger's varying relations to the Dane serve to 
demarcate both the beginning and the end of the salutary "hermeneutics of 
facticity" stretch of the Denkweg. As Caputo sees it, Heidegger's first 
(good) Kehrung coincides with his discovery of Kierkegaard. The second 
(bad) Kehrung, in turn, coincides with Heidegger's turning away from 
Kierkegaard to greater involvement with Nietzsche, H6lderlin and the 
Presocratics. (DH 5-6) Second, Caputo uses images from Kierkegaard to 
characterize the fundamental mood and tendency of Heidegger's thought. 
(DH 62) Third, Caputo identifies crucial elements of Heidegger's thought 
as more or less modified (and frequently unacknowledged) borrowings 
from Kierkegaard. (DH 48,181) Fourth, he uses Kierkegaard and his pseu-
donyms to parody the grandiosity of Heidegger at his worst.(DH 74) 
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Finally and most controversially, Caputo tightly links Kierkegaard with 
three French postmodemists that figure prominently in his account of the 
Heidegger affair: Levinas, Lyotard, and Derrida. 
In his conclusion, Caputo writes: 
What is missing from Heidegger, what Heidegger always missed 
and excluded, what he never managed to think or come to grips 
with, is the jewgreek economy that runs through Kierkegaard, 
Levinas, Derrida, and Lyotard .... (DH 211) 
With this linking of names, Caputo takes a position on the controversial 
question of Kierkegaard and postmodemism. Frequently, arguments for 
such an alignment are couched in terms of Kierkegaard's rhetorical strate-
gies, his use of pseudonymity and irony, his penchant for constructing self-
consuming literary artifacts. But in speaking of a shared "jewgreek econo-
my," Caputo makes his case for so aligning Kierkegaard on a broader and 
more substantial basis. Most straightforwardly, "jewgreek" denotes a join-
ing of the Hebraic and the Hellenic, the spiritual commerce between 
Athens and Jerusalem. So co-implicated are "jew" and "greek" in 
Kierkegaard that it has always been impossible to classify him neatly as a 
philosopher or as a theologian. He works the faultlines that lie between 
the two, always insisting on their difference but never allowing either to go 
its way undisturbed by the other. As Caputo points out, such a bringing 
together of the biblical and the philosophical is nowhere more evident in 
the twentieth century than in Levinas. He further argues for a similar if 
more subtle interweaving of the two in Derrida.2 But Caputo's aligning of 
Kierkegaard with the French postmodemists is based on more than some 
generic bringing together of the Greek and the Jewish. Caputo insists on a 
richer significance of the term: 
Jewgreek thinking watches very closely to see what philosophy 
abolishes as irrational, unnatural, and particularist in virtue of the 
intimidating power and prestige of reason, nature, universality, and 
humanity.(DH 211) 
The jewgreek is not other than philosophy, not simply other, 
because we - who are "we"?- are all Greek, always and already 
Greek, and philosophical conceptuality is - for those of us who have 
been enculturated in the Euro-world - an inescapable given. But by 
putting the question of the other to philosophy, jewgreek thinking in 
fact raises the question of the other of philosophy. The jewgreek 
experience of the other, the passionate intensity of a jewgreek poetics 
or quasi-ethics of mercy or kardia, irrupts in the center of philosophy 
and disrupts its project of comprehension ... .The oddity and impurity 
of the jewgreek is its focus on what has been "excluded," its hyper-
bolic sensitivity to the claim of the other, its demand for justice for the 
least among us, for the despised, the different, the dispossessed, and 
the helpless.(DH 212-213) 
Caputo has chosen well in making this concept, "jewgreek," the site for 
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an alignment of Kierkegaard with French postmodernism. The shared 
themes that emerge as Caputo unpacks the concept are unmistakable. 
There is a shared interest in saving the particular from subsumption under 
the universal, a questioning of the way "reason" functions to legitimate the 
power of the powerful, a protest against the disinterested "project of com-
prehension," and a statement of the claims of the neighbor (in the biblical 
sense of the term). On these points, all of which involve pressing the 
claims of some other against some monolithic sameness, I wholeheartedly 
concur with Caputo that Kierkegaard is the spiritual and intellectual com-
rade of the French postmodernists. 
But something is very strange about Caputo's project of alignment, 
nonetheless. To see this, we need to return to the topic of myth. The 
book's title, of course, is Demythologizing Heidegger. As Caputo points out, 
"demythologizing" may easily be mistaken to denote a distilling of fact 
from fiction. But Caputo denies the possibility of escaping myth. Instead, 
he contrasts pernicious myth and beneficial myth . 
... [I]t is not a question of getting beyond myth or laying aside 
metaphysics, but rather of inventing new and more salutary myths, 
or of recovering other and older myths, myths to counter the destruc-
tive myths of violence, domination, patriarchy, and hierarchy ... The 
issue, then, is not divided between mythologizing and demythologiz-
ing ... but between dangerous myths and salutary myths; between 
privileging, elitist, and hierarchizing myths and myths that promote 
justice and multiplicity; between exclusionary and oppressive myths 
and liberating, empowering myths. 
The question of "demythologizing Heidegger" then comes down 
to the task of disrupting the myth of Being with the myth of 
Justice .... (DH 3) 
There is something disturbingly circular about Caputo's proposal here 
to use one myth, the myth of Justice, as the criterion by which to judge 
whether other myths are salutary or dangerous. For the question is close at 
hand as to the legitimacy (the salutary character!) of the myth of Justice 
itself. When we recall the etymological connection of "salutary" to the 
Latin "salus"(=health), we see that Caputo has described the evaluation of 
myths in surprisingly Nietzschean terms. In his revaluation of values, 
Nietzsche labels Caputo's "myth of justice" (i.e. love for "the least of 
these") as dangerous and the "privileging, elitist, hierarchizing myths" 
(though certainly not the "myth of Being") as salutary. Caputo's refusal to 
move beyond talk of myth to assert the objective truth of (at least some) 
value claims makes it difficult to see how he could adequately respond to 
such challenges.3 But Caputo is wedded, nonetheless to speaking of a 
myth of justice because he believes justice is necessarily utopian, an ideal 
unrealized and unrealizable at any time or place . 
... [T]o instantiate a mythic structure, to say it was actualized here 
or there, in some place or people, some language or age, is to institute 
privileged times and privileged places, to authorize hierarchization 
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and elitist rank-orderings among existing beings. Justice cannot be 
localized, pinned down to a place or a time. The myth of justice does 
not take the form of a geophilosophical myth precisely because it is a 
myth of what is owed to the homeless and uprooted. The condition 
of the possibility of a salutary myth, which is also its condition of 
impossibility, is that it is not actual. Justice does not belong to a time 
that can be recalled, recollected, interiorized, repeated, to a time that 
was or has been all along, but to time immemorial, a time remem-
bered, to unrememberable time, an impossible time that never was 
actual even as it calls out incessantly for actualization. Or to a place, 
to some land or soil, some nation or fatherland. 
That brings us in sharp contrast with Heidegger's mythologizing 
operation, which, as we have seen, consists precisely in locating the 
mythic space in actuality, giving it a historical name, attaching it to 
"this people" (two of them, actually)[Greece and Germany]. The 
whole idea behind the myth of justice is to avoid playing 
favorites, which is why the myth of justice is betrayed by locating a 
chosen people (the Jews), or the people of God (the Christians), as if 
some people were and some people were not God's, as if God prefers 
Jews to Egyptians, Christians to Jews, Europeans to non-Westerners, 
and so on. The whole idea of justice is not to exclude anyone from 
the kingdom, which means the kingdom is nowhere in 
particular.(DH190) 
It is in this passage that the radical incompatibility of Kierkegaard and 
Caputo emerges. Undoubtedly, the universality of God's love is a funda-
mental Kierkegaardian theme. But note that Caputo, while appealing to 
Kierkegaard, actually reverses Kierkegaard's characterization of the Greek 
and the Christian. For Caputo, Heidegger went astray by crediting some 
of the Greeks with a special insight and, consequently, a unique standing. 
Caputo challenges and subverts such privilegings by invoking the univer-
sality implicit in biblical demands for love and justice. 
In contrast, Kierkegaard, especially in the Climacus texts, associates the 
Greeks with universality, with the idea that the truth is within us all and 
only needs to be recollected, perhaps under the guidance of a Socratic 
teacher. In the Postscript, he labels this perspective Religiousness A. 
Further, Kierkegaard identifies Christianity (=Religiousness B) with the 
scandalous notion that humans have somehow divorced themselves from 
the truth and can only be restored to the truth by a special relation to a spe-
cial teacher, the god-man, who appeared at a particular time and a particu-
lar place. 
Thus, where Caputo condemns the privileged particularity of 
Heidegger's "pure Greek" myth of Being and seeks to correct it with bibli-
cal universality, Kierkegaard associates universality with the Greeks and 
the scandal of privileged particularity with the Christian notion that no one 
can come to God except through the Son, Jesus. This Christian notion of 
privileged particularity has, of course, its analog in the Jewish self-identifi-
cation as God's chosen people. Caputo notes these claims to particular 
privileged status in the quotation above, but he dismisses them as unfortu-
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nate departures from the core biblical message of equality and universality. 
Kierkegaard, in contrast, makes such claims the scandalous essence of 
Christian i ty. 
Is the disagreement between Caputo and Kierkegaard simply a matter 
of the two identifying different aspects of Christianity as the kerygma of 
the faith? No. For Kierkegaard agrees with Caputo that the love of the 
neighbor is the heart and soul of biblical faith. But, unlike Caputo, 
Kierkegaard sees that ethical message as indissolubly linked to the revela-
tiona 1 character of that faith. In Works of Love, a text Caputo nowhere cites 
in this book, Kierkegaard argues that the Christian command to love one's 
neighbor as oneself is a scandal and bafflement to human reason. It is an 
ethical view that "did not rise up in any human's heart": 
You shall love - this, then, is the word of the royal law. And truly, 
my reader, if you are capable of forming a conception of the condi-
tions in the world before these words were spoken, or if you strive to 
understand yourself and give heed to the lives and dispositions of 
those who, although they call themselves Christians, really live with-
in pagan concepts - then in relation to this Christian imperative, as 
in relation to everything Christian, you will humbly confess with the 
wonder of faith that such a command did not spring up in any 
human heart.... What courage it takes to say for the first time, "You 
shall love," or, more correctly, what divine authority it takes to tum 
natural man's conceptions and ideas upside-down with this phrase! 
For there at the boundary where human speech halts and courage 
forsakes one, there revelation breaks forth with divine creativeness 
and proclaims what it is not difficult to understand in the sense of 
profundity or human parallels, but which still did not rise up in any 
human heart....(WL 40-41) 
All this is rather too ontotheologic for Caputo. For to acknowledge 
such a God is to fall into just the sorts of bad myths of monogenesis and 
presence and hierarchy and actuality which Caputo argues led to 
Heidegger's Nazism. Caputo's resistance to the idea of a transcendent, real 
God is evident when he uses Derrida to correct Levinas's "ethico-theo-logi-
cal" excesses. 
The Levinasian gesture that requires deconstruction, even 
demythologization, is to reify this infinity [of the demands of justice], 
to make it a metaphysical being - which Levinas cannot call Being 
and will not call a mere fiction. The Levinasian gesture is like the 
Heideggerian to just this extent: that it attributes actuality or reality to 
what it valorizes, that it claims this infinity is real, ad literam, ad infini-
tum. But in Derrida, the quasi infinity of undeconstructible justice is 
neither Being nor otherwise than Being; the excess is not the excess of 
being but the excess of a linguistic performance .... (DH 200) 
To see how far Caputo and Derrida are from Kierkegaard on this point I 
recommend Merold Westphal's recent work showing that Kierkegaard's 
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notion of God is much more robustly transcendent than is Levinas's.' 
But Kierkegaard's theological benightedness, by Caputo's standards, 
involves a transgression even worse than belief in a transcendent, 
"ontotheologic" God. As Kierkegaard sees it, God's revelation of the 
"royal law" to love one's neighbor is radically particular: first, through the 
Old Testament prophets and then, preeminently, through the life and 
death of Jesus. Kierkegaard's belief in the unique revelational status of a 
particular Semitic tribe and a peculiar Judean carpenter is formally identi-
cal to Heidegger's belief in the unique revelational status of the presocratic 
Greeks. Not only does this observation make Caputo's enlisting of 
Kierkegaard in his project of "demythologizing Heidegger" highly ques-
tionable but it exposes how outrageous Caputo's explanation of 
Heidegger's Nazism really is. For Caputo fundamentally doesn't trace 
Heidegger's Nazism to particular features of the presocratics Greeks and 
their vision of Being. Rather, it is the sin of privileging, of singling out one 
people or time or event or revelation or savior over others, per se, that 
Caputo decries. He makes this clear on the first page of his book in a pas-
sage already quoted above. There, Caputo asserts that the Greeks repre-
sent for Heidegger "an overarching normative claiming to which we -
and who "we" are is a critical issue here - are all bound more primordial-
ly than we can say and in reference to which everything later is to be com-
pared, either as a falling away and oblivion or as the scene of its 
retrieval."(DH 1) Note that such a broadly stated indictment sweeps up a 
host of faiths and ideologies that are indexed to some particular, normative 
origin - most notably for our purposes God's covenant with Abraham in 
the case of the Jews and God's revelation of Godself in Jesus for Christians, 
but also potentially the American political ideology that attributes such a 
normative status to the Declaration of Independence and Constitution. 
The problem is that there are many differences between the particulari-
ties that are singled out as normative. And it is Caputo's failure to attend 
to these differences in the various particularisms that leads him to tar them 
all with a single brush. Nazi particularism is racist - the Aryan race is 
regarded as uniquely worthy and gifted. In contrast, the particular signifi-
cance of the Greeks for Heidegger relates to the special revelation of Being 
he believed them to have received. Note that Heidegger thought that 
vision of Being was crucially important to humankind generally, and he 
accordingly devoted much of his philosophical career to communicating 
that vision to the modern world. While the significance of the Greek 
understanding of Being is universal, the source and much more important-
ly the idiom of that understanding is particular. According to Heidegger, 
Greek and its linguistic soulmate, German, are uniquely conducive to 
philosophical thought - thus leading Heidegger to assert that the French 
need to learn German if they really want to think philosophically. While 
this assertion of linguistic particularism is implausible and offensive, it 
isn't exclusive in the same way that Nazism is. It is easier to learn German 
than it is to become Aryan. Further, Heidegger's linguistic particularism 
doesn't obviously set anyone outside the pale of ethical consideration in 
the way Nazism does. Jewish particularism, in turn, relates to the belief 
that Jews are the chosen people, that they stand in a special covenental 
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relation to God. But while being Jewish is (typically) a matter of lineage, 
there is a strong sense in Biblical Judaism that the Jewish people's particu-
lar relation to God is of universal significance, that all the nations of the 
earth will come to the mountain of the Lord and be blessed through the 
special covenant of God with the Jewish people. (Micah 4) This self-over-
coming version of particularism receives an even more definite expression 
in Christianity. Jesus Christ, the particular man, living and dying at a par-
ticular place and time, is the one who overcomes all particularities, male 
and female, Jew and Gentile, slave and free, rich and poor. And as 
Kierkegaard so frequently notes, before the paradox of the incarnate God, 
the relative distinctions between the clever and the simple are set at 
nought. 
It is clear then that there are big differences in the particularities 
affirmed in these various cases. In at least one instance, the Nazis, the 
exclusion of others from ethical regard follows naturally from the form of 
particularity affirmed. But in the case of Heidegger's Greeks, such a conse-
quence is dubious, and in the cases of Judaism and Christianity, it is explic-
itly excluded by the specific character of the particularity affirmed. Once 
again, the problem is that Caputo doesn't make these distinctions. Rather, 
it is the privileging of any particularity, per se, that he targets. In a passage 
quoted above, Caputo opposed the myth of justice to any notion of a cho-
sen people (the Jews) or a people of God (Christians), to any notion of a 
privileged time or place, to any "elitist rank orderings among existing 
beings," (DH 190) since he views all such assignments of ultimate signifi-
cance to particularities as inevitably exclusionary. He writes, "The whole 
idea of justice is not to exclude anyone from the kingdom, which means 
the kingdom is nowhere in particular."(DH 190) But what of a privileged 
epistemological particularity (a revelation) or a privileged soteriological 
particularity (a savior) that was both of ultimate significance and yet not 
exclusionary in the way Caputo finds objectionable? Why can't one who 
believes that God has uniquely revealed Godself in Jesus also insist on 
treating even those who don't share such a belief with the respect they 
deserve as children of God and beneficiaries of Christ's self-sacrificial love? 
Kierkegaard, for one, believed that such a conclusion should be drawn. 
Caputo, in contrast, thinks that all claims of unique significance for par-
ticularities, be they races, nations, people, or revelations, all notions of "pri_ 
mordial incipience" and "monogenesis," are inherently invidiously exclu-
sionary and are thus "dangerous" and "oppressive." So, in spite of his 
claim to invoke Christianity as a corrective to Heidegger's Nazism, in spite 
of his assertion that Heideggers movement toward Nazism began with a 
flawed reading of biblical texts and culminated in a purging of biblical 
traces from his thought, Caputo implicitly accuses Christianity and every 
other religion that appeals to special revelation of Nazi tendencies. 
In closing, I will comment on this essay's title, "Deconstructing 
Caputo's Demythologizing Heidegger." I take deconstruction to designate 
reading a text so as to find tendencies and implications that are different 
from and even directly opposed to the explicit, self-described project of the 
text. We see a number of such internal rifts in Caputo's book. First, 
though it presents itself preeminently as a historical text reconstructing the 
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development of Heidegger's thought, I have argued that it is more plausi-
bly read as a plea for a particular version of "multiculturalism." Second, 
though Caputo repeatedly invokes Kierkegaard as a corrective to 
Heidegger, his criticisms of Heidegger are so diffuse as to include 
Kierkegaard as well. Third, while it is overtly an impassioned plea for the 
biblical witness to leaven the philosophical loaf, Caputo's book actually 
represents a slander against that biblical witness. In asserting that 
Heidegger's thought is genuinely Nazi because of his belief that something 
had been uniquely revealed to the Greeks, Caputo is actually labeling all 
claims to special revelation as fundamentally Nazi in character. Finally, 
after (correctly) accusing Heidegger of failing to adequately distinguish 
between the Greek and the Christian, Caputo himself fails to distinguish 
the various particularities characteristic of Nazis, Heidegger's Greeks, 
Judaism and Christianity, respectively. 
For an author who touts the post-modern liberation from the sterility of 
Enlightenment Rationalism, Caputo's fundamental argument is ironically 
reminiscent of Lessing's Nathan the Wise: people of various faiths can get 
along with each other by renouncing claims to special revelation and by 
emphasizing those faiths' common ethical teachings. And Caputo's belief 
that the "myth of justice" at the heart of the biblical tradition can be sepa-
rated from those parts of the tradition that speak of chosen people, unique 
incarnation, and special revelation is distinctly similar to Kant's attempt in 
Religion within the Bounds of Reason Alone to refine the ethical gold of the 
Christian religion out of its mixture with superstitious slag. 
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NOTES 
1. Caputo offers extensive discussion of these three thinkers in his Against 
Ethics: Contributions to a Poetics of Obligation with Constant Reference to 
Deconstructioll (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), a book that bears 
significantly on the themes explored in Demythologizing Heidegger. 
2. See also Caputo's "The Good News about Alterity: Derrida and 
Theology," Faith and Philosophy, 10:4 (October, 1993) 453-470. 
3. I hesitate to use the term "ethical teachings" here given Caputo's recent 
Against Ethics. Still, I use it for want of a better term to cover those matters that 
Caputo associates with the phrase "the myth of justice." 
4. Merold Westphal, "Levinas, Kierkegaard and the Theological Task," 
Modern Theology 8:3 (July, 1992) 241-262. 
